Q: What is a mortgage?
A: Contrary to popular belief, a “mortgage” is not a loan from a bank to buy a house. Although the term mortgage has become eponymous with these loans, a mortgage is more precisely defined as a charge or encumbrance registered on a property title to secure an interest.
Q: If I have a bank mortgage, does the bank own my property?
A: No. This is a common misconception that stems from the historical way mortgages were created. A mortgage is a charge or debt on the property. While it gives the mortgagee (the person lending the money) certain powers over the property, it does not give the mortgagee ownership of the property.
Q: Can the mortgagee sell my house?
Yes. Mortgagees can exercise something known as the “power of sale” if the mortgagor (the person borrowing the money and usually the owner of the property) fails to comply with their obligations under a mortgage. However, this does not mean that the bank can show up at your front door with a real estate agent and a “for sale” sign just because you fall behind on a repayment. The power of sale can only be exercised in very specific circumstances and through very strict procedures.
Q: Can a mortgage be registered over personal property?
A: Generally not. Mortgages by definition can only be registered over real property. There is however something called the Personal Property Securities Register, which is managed by the Treasury and which permits people to register encumbrances or charges over personal property, even intangible personal property. This functions similarly to a mortgage in some ways, but is quite distinct.
Q: Will the mortgage be removed once I pay it off?
A: No. This is a common question which highlights the importance of distinguishing between the loan, being the money advanced, and the mortgage, which is an interest registered over the property (basically just a two page form submitted at the Land Titles Office). While you may have paid off the loan, unless the bank submits a discharge of mortgage, the mortgage will remain on title even though the loan is repaid.
If you have more questions in regard to mortgage, get in touch with our property lawyers.
You might have heard the phrase “no-win no-fee” in the media, especially in relation to personal injury claims, but what does it actually mean?
Each costs agreement may be slightly different, but we have set our below what ‘no-win no-fee means in general terms.
What does “no win-no fee’ mean?
‘No win no fee’ means that your professional legal fees are only payable in the event of a successful outcome. A successful outcome means that you have achieved a resolution of your claim through either a settlement or a Court decision, whereby compensation or damages are paid to you.
This type of costs agreement gives everyone access to legal representation in a personal injury matter and ensures everyone has a fair chance of seeking compensation for injuries they have suffered at no fault of their own. Most of our clients are not in a position to pay for legal costs upfront, particularly in circumstances where they are injured and not able to work.
How much do I pay if my claim is successful?
If your claim is successful, depending on the terms of the settlement, the defendant may pay a large portion of your legal fees. Your lawyer may then recover the remaining legal fees associated with your case from your settlement sum. This should agreed between you and your solicitor prior to accepting any settlement amount and should be reasonable within the scope of your case.
What if my claim is not successful?
If your claim is not successful, i.e there is “no win”, then under your ‘no win no fee’ agreement you will not be required to pay your solicitor’s professional legal fees.
However you should also be aware, depending on the terms of your agreement, if your claim is not successful you may still be required to pay for any disbursements incurred by your solicitor on your behalf. Disbursements may include expenses such as court fees, requests for medical records and expert reports.
If you lose your case, in some circumstances you may also be required to pay the other side’s costs. You should consult your solicitor to discuss these terms in detail and what it can mean if you are not successful.
How can Chamberlains Help?
At Chamberlains we can provide assistance with making personal injury claims and offer ‘no win – no free’ arrangements for your claim. Contact us today for an obligation free appointment with our experienced team.
***Assisted by Anna Halpin***
In the decision of Global Pacific Aerospace Pty Limited [2012] VSC 291, The Supreme Court of Victoria considered a dispute between directors of a company, and whether it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up.
W and B were 50/50 shareholders in a company that bought a helicopter for $1.6m. W and B were also the company’s sole directors.
$1.12m of the purchase price was borrowed and secured by a mortgage. W and some related entities gave a guarantee in respect of that loan.
The company couldn’t make the payments. The lender caused the helicopter to be sold for a shortfall of around $457,000.00.
The lender sued W and their related entities for the shortfall pursuant to the guarantee.
Interestingly, the purchaser of the helicopter was a different company wholly owned and controlled by B, who had not given a guarantee.
W says B used his position as director of the company to negotiate a lower price for the helicopter, breaching his directors duties. W sought to bring derivative proceedings to pursue this claim.
B applied to wind up the company on the basis that it would be just and equitable to do so.
B claimed that W excluded them, treated the company as their own, breached duties in buying the helicopter for an inflated price and then failed to maintain it, and failed to manage the company’s obligations to its lender.
W said B’s claim was an attempt by B to protect themselves from the derivative claim and, as there was no money, a liquidator would not chase B for B’s breach of their directors duties.
The company had no ongoing business. Its sole assets were claims against B, W, and the lender.
The Court considered it would be just and equitable to wind up the company because: (i) it was being sued by a secured creditor, (ii) the directors’ relationship had broken down, (iii) each director alleges the other has breached their directors duties with evidence from both showing neither’s claim is frivolous.
The Court considered preferable course was for an independent liquidator to be appointed to investigate all claims and noted “liquidators commonly find a way to obtain funding if there is a potentially good cause of action available to the company”.
The company was wound up on the just and equitable ground.
Poor corporate governance can put a company’s existence at risk.
If you have any legal questions about commercial and corporate law, reach out to our specialists at Chamberlains Law Firm!
The case for fixed vs ordinary costs
The federal system has an array of alternatives available to litigants seeking to avoid the traditional costs assessment process.
Reflective of a broader approach to streamlined, accessible and efficient litigation in the federal system, the ability of litigants to seek lump-sum costs orders is designed to avoid the expense, delay and aggravation involved in protracted litigation.
Careful consideration is given by judicial officers to ensure any lump-sum order meets the requirements to achieve procedural fairness and natural justice in the circumstances. Various criteria must be met to ensure a fixed costs order is the appropriate mechanism to redress the successful party in the circumstances of the particular matter.
This article will take a brief look at the rules allowing for fixed costs orders in the Federal Circuit Court and the Federal Court, and when they might be applied.
Rule 21.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)
Unless the Court otherwise orders, a party entitled to costs in a proceeding (other than a proceeding to which the Bankruptcy Act applies) is entitled to:
Rule 21.10 provides that costs are to be awarded in fixed sums for certain events, unless the court orders otherwise. Costs are calculated by reference to different stages of proceedings, with attendances at hearings charged at daily hearing fee rates. Distinction is made between family law matters and other federal laws, with the allowable amount for each stage set as a fixed sum (see Table 1 below).
Click to view table 1: Fixed costs schedule (Federal Circuit Court)
The Court has a general discretion to depart from the fixed event-based scale. Sometimes the court may order that a specific amount of costs be paid. In these situations, the judge may assess the costs by using departure from the event-based scale of costs:
The Federal Court is conferred the power to award a fixed sum for costs pursuant to s43(3)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
The Court or a Judge has jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before the Court (including proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction) other than proceedings in respect of which this or any other Act provides that costs must not be awarded. This is subject to:
In a representative proceeding commenced under Part IVA or a proceeding of a representative character commenced under any other Act that authorises the commencement of a proceeding of that character, the Court or Judge may not award costs against a person on whose behalf the proceeding has been commenced (other than a party to the proceeding who is representing such a person) except as authorised by:
Note: For further provision about the award of costs, see subsections 37N(4) and (5) and paragraphs 37P(6)(d) and (e).
A party or a person who is entitled to costs may apply to the Court for an order that costs:
Note 1: The Court may order that costs be paid on an indemnity basis.
Note 2: The Court may order that the costs be determined by reference to a cost assessment scheme operating under the law of a State or Territory.
Section 43(2) provides that “except as provided by any other Act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the Court or Judge.” The discretion is absolute and unfettered subject to the requirement that it be exercised judicially: Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR151 at 152
In the leading case of Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) [1995] FCA 350, Von Doussa J considered the Court’s discretion to award lump sum costs instead of ordering a taxation. Key principles include:
The cases also show some of the considerations found to be relevant when the court has refused to order lump sum costs. These include:
We at Chamberlains understand the emotional and financial stress that come with litigation. Should you require further information about how costs can be recoverable in matters before the Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court, please do not hesitate to contact our office for a consultation with our construction law team.
The Supreme Court of New South Wales has overturned part of the decision in Joye Group Pty Limited v Cemco Projects Pty Limited [2021] NSWDC 151. The decision in Joye Group Pty Ltd v Cemco Projects Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 211 is a timely reminder that whilst payment schedules do not need to be extensive documents, they do need to comply with the requirements of s14 of the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 1999 (NSW) (Act) (or the equivalent legislation in the state or territory where the work is performed.
Particularly, the payment schedule needs to indicate any reasons for non-payment of a payment claim, in the document itself. Simply relying on earlier correspondence about outstanding or defective work might not be enough to justify non-payment.
Any reference in a payment schedule to earlier correspondence or reasons as to why payment might be withheld should be made clear within the payment schedule itself, as the court will likely be reluctant to read in any reasons for withholding payment.
When issuing a payment schedule, if a respondent intends to rely upon a document or piece of correspondence that they previously provided to the claimant, they should ensure the reference to that document is specific, or include a further copy, so as to avoid their payment schedule potentially being invalid.
The parties entered into two written subcontracts, being for the supply and installation of tiling, and the supply and installation of timber, for a project in Alexandria. Joye Group Pty Ltd (Joye Group) issued four invoices endorsed as payment claims in March and April 2020 for tile and timber flooring work pursuant to the subcontracts.
Cemco Projects Pty Ltd (Cemco) failed to pay those tax invoices.
The tax invoices issued, and the Cemo’s responses, were as follows:
The matter was heard in the District Court before Strathdee DCJ. By way of amended statement of claim filed 22 June 2020, Joye Group sought payment of the four payment claims from Cemco.
It was conceded by Cemco that invoices JS19774 and SJA19284 were valid payment claims and should have been paid. Judgment was subsequently entered against Cemco with respect to those invoices (Order 1). The issue before her Honour was whether the email sent by Cemco to Joye Group on 8 May 2020 was a payment schedule for the purposes of the Act.
Whilst the parties held different views as to the clarity of the 8 May 2020 email and whether it sufficiently identified the invoices for which Cemco purported to make no payment, Her Honour found at [21] that “It is hard to imagine how much clearer the defendant could make their position, that there will be no payment, thus the plaintiff must fail on this argument.”
Further, and noting the Act requires that a payment schedule must discuss the reasons for withholding payment, Her Honour’s view was that the use of the word indicate in s14 supports the proposition that full particulars are not required [at 24].
Her Honour’s finding was that prior correspondence between the parties gave sufficient context as to the reasons for withholding payment, and that the 8 May 2020 email complied with the requirements for a valid payment schedule. Accordingly, judgment was not entered with regard to invoices JSA19293 and JS19794 (Order 2).
Joye Group appealed the decision as it related to Order 2, with the matter being heard before Basten JA, Macfarlan JA and Emmett AJA. Basten JA gave the leading judgment. His Honour noted that the adequacy of the payment schedule turned on whether or not it indicated why the amount agreed to be paid was less than the amount claimed, as required by s14(3) of the Act [at 11].
The decision in Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Luikens and Anor [2003] NSWSC 114 was cited as authoritative with regard to the contents of a payment schedule, particularly the explanation given by Palmer J as follows:
“[67] … The evident purpose of s 13(1) and (2), s 14(1), (2) and (3), and s 20(2B) is to require the parties to define clearly, expressly and as early as possible what are the issues in dispute between them; the issues so defined are the only issues which the parties are entitled to agitate in their dispute and they are the only issues which the adjudicator is entitled to determine under s 22. It would be entirely inimical to the quick and efficient adjudication of disputes which the scheme of the Act envisages if a respondent were able to reject a payment claim, serve a payment schedule which said nothing except that the claim was rejected, and then ‘ambush’ the claimant by disclosing for the first time in its adjudication response that the reasons for the rejection were founded upon a certain construction of the contractual terms or upon a variety of calculations, valuations and assessments said to be made in accordance with the contractual terms but which the claimant has had no prior opportunity of checking or disputing. In my opinion, the express words of s 14(3) and s 20(2B) are designed to prevent this from happening.
…
[76] A payment claim and a payment schedule are, in many cases, given and received by parties who are experienced in the building industry and are familiar with the particular building contract, the history of construction of the project and the broad issues which have produced the dispute as to the claimant’s payment claim. a payment claim and a payment schedule must be produced quickly; much that is contained therein in an abbreviated form which would be meaningless to the uninformed reader will be understood readily by the parties themselves. A payment claim and a payment schedule should not, therefore, be required to be as precise and as particularised as a pleading in the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, precision and particularity must be required to a degree reasonably sufficient to apprise the parties of the real issues in the dispute.”
Further, His Honour considered the judgment of Leeming JA in Style Timber Floor Pty Ltd v Krivosudsky [2019] NSWCA 171, which endorsed the reasoning in Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Luikens & Anor:
“[45] Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly for present purposes, the payment schedule serves two important functions under the Act. The first is to inform the claimant as to the metes and bounds of its dispute with the respondent, so that it can make an informed choice as to whether to engage the expedited pro tem adjudication procedures under Division 2. The second is to articulate the respondent’s case which will then be determined by the adjudicator. It will also enable adjudicators to assess whether to accept appointment as an adjudicator to a dispute. At the time an adjudication application is made, all that the claimant and the prospective adjudicator will know of the nature of the respondent’s side of the case is what is contained in its payment schedule.”
…
“[47] When dealing with the requirements of a payment claim, Palmer J’s analysis was endorsed by this Court in Clarence Street … at [31]. While it is clear that an abbreviated description, falling short of a pleading, will suffice, the passages emphasised indicate that the payment schedule must sufficiently describe the dispute so as to enable the claimant to determine whether to proceed in the knowledge of the nature of the case it will have to meet.
[48] It is established that even where a respondent proposes to pay no part of a payment claim, it is still required to indicate reasons in accordance with s 14(3). [7] That, with respect, must be so having regard to, inter alia, the limiting effect of s 20(2B). It was not suggested in this Court that s 14(3) did not apply to Style Timber Floor on the basis that it refused to pay the entirety of the claim.”
His Honour found that a statement to the effect of “we do not intend to pay your claim” does not provide a reason for non-payment, much the same as a statement along the lines of “we will not pay your claim until…” does not confirm that some or all of the claim will not be paid, as it leaves open the possibility that there is no dispute that the work subject to the claim has been carried out [at 19].
As to the primary judge’s reasoning, His Honour found that the inferences drawn from background of communications were not properly open for the purpose upon which it was relied [at 21]. There was no attempt by Cemco, either expressly or by necessary inference, to make refence to any of the supporting documents or prior correspondence in the 8 May 2020 email.
His Honour gave a useful insight into how the court views the content of a payment schedule at [24], stating that:
In principle, it may be accepted that not only communications but other contextual evidence may be necessary and relevant to allow an adjudicator (or the court) to understand the scope of terms used in a payment schedule (or in a payment claim). That is not this case: there was no term used in the 8 May 2020 email which required interpretation. Rather, what was sought to be achieved by reference to extraneous documents was to create a sufficient degree of particularly in the absence of incorporation. That course is not available. A payment schedule is not to be reconstructed by reference to external materials, so as to give it a degree of particularity which it simply did not enjoy.
Ultimately, His Honour formed the view that the 8 May 2020 email did not satisfy the purpose behind the statutory scheme that the Act was designed to implement, and did not conform with the requirements of a valid payment schedule. Judgment was entered for Joye Group with respect to invoices JSA19293 & JS19794.
It is critical that a payment schedule makes abundantly clear any reasons for non-payment of a payment claim. Any assertions relied upon as to reasons for withholding payment should be express and any issues in dispute (such as outstanding work) clarified at the time of issuing the payment schedule.
We at Chamberlains understand the emotional and financial stress that come with litigation. Should you require further information about how costs can be recoverable in matters before the Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court, please do not hesitate to contact our office for a consultation with our construction law team.
The power of courts in NSW to award costs to litigants is conferred by the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (Act), which gives the court full power to determine by whom, to whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and the basis on which they are to be paid, regardless of how advanced the litigation is (subject to any statutory provisions to the contrary).
There are various statutory provisions providing for lump sum or fixed costs events, such as in matters before the Small Claims Division of the Local Court, in undefended recoveries of liquidated debts and when enforcing judgment debts. These costs are provided in schedule 1 of the relevant Local, District and Supreme Court Acts.
The Supreme Court provides the mechanism for the costs assessment process for all costs orders made in inferior courts and tribunals.
Whilst an important tool in the litigation spectrum, costs assessment does necessarily require further time and expenditure. Happily, the Act provides an alternative to the often protracted and expensive costs assessment process.
Section 98(4)(c) of the Act permits a court to make a gross sum costs order instead of referring the matter for assessment.
Courts powers as to costs:
Subject to rules of court and to this or any other Act, a party to proceedings may not recover costs from any other party otherwise than pursuant to an order of the court. An order as to costs may be made by the court at any stage of the proceedings or after the conclusion of the proceedings.
In particular, at any time before costs are referred for assessment, the court may make an order to the effect that the party to whom costs are to be paid is to be entitled to:
The powers of the court under this section apply in relation to a married woman, whether as party, tutor, relator or otherwise, and this section has effect in addition to, and despite anything in, the Married Persons (Equality of Status) Act 1996.
This power “should only be exercised when the Court considered that it can do so fairly between the parties, and this includes sufficient confidence in arriving at an appropriate sum on the materials available”: Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR at [22].
If a gross sum costs order is made at the conclusion of the proceeding then the whole costs assessment task can be avoided and secondly, as there is an order in a fixed amount it can be entered as a judgment if payment does not occur.
Gross sum costs order are regularly advanced in the following situations:
An application for a specific gross sum costs order is made by way of separate motion that requires evidence sufficient to support the application. Any affidavit material relied upon in support of a motion for a gross sum costs order should contain enough information for the court to make a decision as to appropriate quantum.
We at Chamberlains understand the stresses and expenses that come with running a litigated matter, and additional difficulty that costs assessment can sometimes bring.
Should you require further information about how costs can be recoverable in NSW, please do not hesitate to contact our office for a consultation with our team of construction law experts.
Key takeaways
The NSW government has announced that from Monday 27 September 2021 the 50% capacity limit at construction sites across the state will be scrapped. All construction sites will also be subject to the one person per m2 rule from 27 September 2021.
The announcement is a stark contrast to the developments in Victoria, where the construction industry was today shut down for two weeks amid transmission concerns following consecutive days of protests by construction industry participants.
Construction workers living in or staying within a local government area of concern in NSW are still not permitted to enter or remain at a construction site unless they have any of the following:
The rules provide that if a construction work is required to have a COVID-19 test to enter or remain at a construction site, they must do so once every 72 hours. The NSW government has confirmed this can include rapid antigen testing in the manner approved by the Chief Health Officer. Medical exemptions are otherwise available for construction workers who are unable to have a COVID-19 vaccine.
Evidence of vaccination can be in the form of an immunisation history statement or COVID-19 digital certificate issued by the Australia Immunisation Register. Workers must carry evidence of vaccination, a COVID-19 test or medical exemption (whichever applies) at all times.
Further information is available via the NSW government website here.
Site requirements
Regional NSW requirements
We’re here to help
We at Chamberlains appreciate the difficulties all stakeholders in the construction industry have been facing in recent times, as well as the confusion that comes with progressive amendments to public health orders affecting people from different areas across the state.
Should you or your business need assistance to navigate any legal issues which have arisen during these unprecedented times, please do not hesitate to contact our building and construction law team.
The Supreme Court of Western Australia has delivered one of the few decisions to shed light on when provisions contained in Schedule 1 to the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) (CCA) will be implied into a construction contract.
Unlike the East Coast security of payment regimes, statutory provisions under the CCA regulating matters such as:
only apply if the construction contract is silent on those matters.
Where silence exists, the relevant terms contained in the corresponding Division of Schedule 1 are implied.
In Total Eden Pty Ltd v Charteris [2018] WASC 80, the WA Supreme Court clarified the limits of when Schedule 1 terms are implied.
The adjudicator implied the entire Division 5 into the contract, resulting in new, statutory payment timing obligations that conflicted with the parties’ written agreement.
The WA Supreme Court held that the adjudicator erred, quashed the entire determination, and confirmed the following principles:
The CCA does not permit the wholesale implication of a full Division of Schedule 1.
Instead, the Court held that:
Implying all of Division 5 created an internal inconsistency with the contract’s existing payment terms.
Clause 7(3) of Division 5 could not be implied because:
The Court concluded the adjudicator incorrectly implied clause 7(3), and therefore made a jurisdictional error, invalidating the whole determination.
Contracting parties should ensure that their construction contracts:
We at Chamberlains understand the emotional and financial stress that come with litigation. Should you require further information about how costs can be recoverable in matters before the Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court, please do not hesitate to contact our office for a consultation with our construction law team.
Case note on Denham Constructions Pty Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 215
The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory has confirmed that for a respondent to validly issue a payment schedule under the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 (ACT) (“ACT SOP Act”), the schedule must strictly comply with ss 16(2) – (3).
This case makes clear that:
The decision is also significant because the Court confirmed that:
The Court held the email failed all key requirements of s 16 because:
It did not identify the payment claim
It did not state the scheduled amount
It did not provide reasons for all withheld amounts
The respondent argued the payment claim was invalid because:
The Court rejected this.
Reference Date Argument
Repeating Variations Is Not an Abuse of Process
The respondent argued the ACT Legislature:
The Court rejected both arguments:
National Land
Seat of Government
We at Chamberlains understand the emotional and financial stress that come with litigation. Should you require further information about how costs can be recoverable in matters before the Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court, please do not hesitate to contact our office for a consultation with our construction law team.
GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2021] NSWSC 1204 (24 September 2021)
The NSW Supreme Court has rejected an application by the Catholic Church for a permanent stay of a claim alleging that a priest sexually abused a child in 1968.
On 31 January 2020, the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the Catholic Church (The Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore) for damages arising out of an allegation of child sexual abuse against her in 1968, when she was then aged 14 years.
The plaintiff alleged that Father Clarence Anderson sexually assaulted her in her home while giving pastoral care to her family after her father was involved in a motorcycle accident.
Father Anderson passed away in 1996, and the Church argued that the passage of time and the death of Father Anderson and other members of the clergy with knowledge of the matter meant a potential trial would be “unjustifiably oppressive”. Due to this, the Church petitioned the Court to order a permanent stay on proceedings.
Arguing that her case should not be stayed, the plaintiff relied on subpoenaed documents from the Brisbane Archdiocese, the NSW/ACT Professional Standards Office, and documents provided in response to a Notice to Produce.
The documents showed that as early as 1965, Father Anderson was observed by other members of the Church to exhibit a sexual interest in children and was ordered to undertake psychiatric treatment after receiving complaints from other children’s parents.
The plaintiff also submitted five unsworn evidentiary statements of five other alleged victims of Father Anderson, and a letter from another member of the Church stating he personally witnessed Father Anderson engage in sexual activities with children.
The defendant submitted evidence that virtually all of the relevant senior persons who could give evidence in the current proceedings have since passed away, and that the Lismore Diocese had not received any complaint relating to the plaintiff’s accusations prior to 2019. The defendant also submitted that there was no evidence for Father Anderson having a sexual interest in young girls.
The Court referred to Moubarak bht Coorey v Holt (2019) 100 NSWLR 218; [2019] NSWCA 102 which stipulates that the Court should only use its inherent power to grant a permanent halt on proceedings in exceptional circumstances, and the onus to prove the Court should grant a halt lies ‘squarely’ on the defendant.
The Court was not satisfied that the Church proved on the balance of probabilities that the continuation of proceedings would be unjustifiably oppressive to the defendant, or that it was impossible for a fair trial to take place. Hence, the Court dismissed the Church’s motion and proceedings will continue.
Chamberlains’ regularly acts in relation to historic abuse claims, if you would like to discuss a claim please contact our experienced team of injury compensation lawyers for a no-obligation chat.
***Assisted by James Carrick***